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TAXATION
OVERVIEW

The tax cases decided by the Tenth Circuit during 1977 represent consistent, conforming applications of the law with no departures from tax principles established previously either by the
Tenth Circuit or by other jurisdictions.' Nevertheless, several of
the cases are worth noting for they delineate the current status
of the tax law in their respective fields.'
The Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to decide several cases, regarding tax protest
litigation, which are more interesting from a sociological than a legal standpoint. The
leading and dispositive case, in a series of four cases, is United States v. Carroll, 567 F.2d
955 (10th Cir. 1977). Following the pattern of tax protest cases, all four cases allege
constitutional claims, specifically contending that the taxpayer's constitutional privileges
under the first (freedom of religion), fourth (protection of privacy) and fifth (freedom from
self-incrimination) amendments have been violated by the Internal Revenue Service. See
United States v. Carroll; United States v. Johnson, No. 77-1366 (10th Cir. Mar. 22, 1978)
(Not for Routine Publication); Ellison v. Commissioner, No. 76-2178 (10th Cir. Jan. 20,
1978) (Not for Routine Publication); and United States v. Cotton, 567 F.2d 958 (10th Cir.
1977).
The Tenth Circuit, relying on well established Supreme Court precedent and on prior
Tenth Circuit cases, dismissed all of the constitutional arguments as meritless. See, e.g.,
United States v. Carroll, (relying on Gillett v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 439 (1971);
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 304 (1940); and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878)).
The Johnson case made the unusual argument that the taxpayer's conviction should
be overturned because the jury panel was not a fair cross section of the community since
it had a disproportionate number of Cheyenne residents and federal and state employees.
The tax protester also argued that the oath taken by the jurors was not in compliance with
Article 6, clause 3 of the Constitution which requires all judicial officers to be bound by
oath to support the Constitution. No. 77-1366, slip. op. at 2.
The Johnson and Ellison cases set forth the incredible argument that they had no
income during the years in question for all of their income was in the form of federal
reserve notes which are not actual dollars because they are not redeemable in gold or
silver. This argument was rejected as meritless on its face by the Tenth Circuit.
I Other cases were decided by the Tenth Circuit, but are not included within the
discussion of this note: United States v. New Mexico, No. 76-1888 (10th Cir. Aug. 7, 1978)
(New Mexico's gross receipt tax on expenses and equipment purchased by contractors.
who had cost plus contracts with the United States which included state and local taxes
within the definition of reimbursable costs, was not unconstitutional because the legal
incidence of the New Mexico tax was on the contractors as sellers of services to the United
States. Id. at 5-10. Further, the New Mexican compensating or use tax placed on reimbursements for property purchased out-of-state and brought into New Mexico for use
under government contracts was valid as, again, the legal incidence of the tax was on the
contractors as purchasers who brought the materials and supplies into New Mexico. Id.
at 10. Finally, the court upheld the rule that a gross receipt tax can be placed on only
those reimbursed general and administrative expenses which arise from contracts and
services performed within New Mexico's borders. Id. at 16-17.); Central Motor Co. v.
United States, 583 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1978) (Whether or not a corporation has accumulated its earnings and profits beyond the reasonable needs of its business, including
reasonably anticipated needs, is a factual determination. Id. at 476. The opinion dis-
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Weisbart
v. Commissioner'
Unlike most taxpayers engaged in the production of goods for
sale who are forced to use the accrual method of accounting in
order to accurately reflect income,' farmers' engaged in the business of raising livestock for profit have been entitled since 1915
to file their returns on the cash basis method and hence, deduct
most production costs in the year of payment irrespective of when
the associated income is earned.' This allowed farmers to manipulate their taxable income by incurring expenses prematurely,
which in turn created a substantial business in the use of farms
as tax shelters. One frequently employed manipulative technique
involved the prepaid feed expense. Feed to be used during the
ensuing year would be prepaid in December to obtain, at that
time, the concomitant deduction.7 Understandably, this device
became the subject of substantial litigation. 8
THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF PAYMENTS FOR CATTLE FEED:

cusses the factors which the Tenth Circuit, and other jurisdictions, consider as indicating whether the accumulation was reasonable. Id. at 476-77 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.5372(b), (c) (1960), and Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 626-28 (1975) (which
the Tenth Circuit viewed as laying down the basic guidelines for the determination of
whether or not earnings had been accumulated unreasonably). See Case Accumulated
Earning Tax Aspects of Business Expansions and Investments, 32 TAX L. REv. 1, 64-65
(1976)); Jacobs Equipment Co. v. United States, 574 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir 1978) (The
act of welding a hoist to a truck body did not constitute "manufacture" of a truck body
within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 4061(a)(1)); Stern v. United States, No. 76-1550
(10th Cir. Sept. 23, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication) (Parole evidence could not be
used to supply the necessary, but unexpressed, restrictions in an instrument of gift in
order for the gift to qualify for a charitable deduction.).
3 564 F.2d 34 (10th Cir. 1977).
1 See generally I.R.C. §§ 446(a)-(c), 471; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.471-1 (1960), 1.471-11
(1973), 1.446-1(c)(20) (1957); see also Comment, Farmers' Prepaid Feed Deductions:
Mann v. Commissioner, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 485.
1 The word "farmers" includes "individuals, joint venturers, partnerships, corporations, or other entities engaged in the business of raising livestock for profit .
Pinney
& Olsen, Farmers' PrepaidFeed Expenses, 25 TAx LAw. 537 (1972).
1 Comment, supra note 4 at 487-88, citing T.D. 2153, 17 TREAS. DEc. INT. REv. 101
(1915). The relevant language for our purposes is now found in Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12(a)
(1972), which states in part:
A farmer who operates a farm for profit is entitled to deduct from gross
income as necessary expenses all amounts actually expended in the carrying
on of the business of farming . . . . The purchase of feed and other costs
connected with raising livestock may be treated as expense deductions insofar as such costs represent actual outlay ....
See Comment, supra note 4, at 487-89.
See, e.g., Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g 41 T.C.M. (PH) 843 (1972); Shippy v. United States, 308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962), aff'g 199 F. Supp.
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Weisbart v. Commissioner represents the most recent case of
this type. Taxpayer Weisbart was the 100% owner of the G. Weisbart and Co., a cash method business whose purpose was the
buying and selling of cattle. Weisbart was also the ninety-two
percent owner of the stock of the 7A Land and Feeding Company.
The two corporations entered into a transaction whereby Weisbart and Co. purchased $100,106 worth of feed from 7A Land and
Feeding Company. In payment for the feed Weisbart and Co.
gave to the 7A Company $100,106 worth of contract rights to
purchase cattle. The feed was purchased on December 16, 1968,
and the evidence established that the major portion of the feed
was not used until 1969. The 7A Company did not take advantage
of the contract rights that it obtained from the transaction, and
on March 31, 1969, Weisbart and Company repurchased all of the
contract rights at the original price.'
The Tenth Circuit upheld the decision of the Tax Court in
rejecting Weisbart and Company's deduction for feed expenses in
1968.10 The court first held that what constitutes payment by a
cash method taxpayer is a question of federal, rather than state,
law and it was open to the Tax Court to conclude that there was
no geuine payment in 1968 resulting from the transfer of the
contract rights."
In resolving the particular situation presented by this litigation the court cited the well-worn tenets of tax law that (1) the
character of a taxpayer's transaction or arrangement is controlled
by substance rather than form, (2) findings as to what is the
substance of a transaction are to be treated as questions of fact
and (3) a trial court's findings of fact are to be upheld unless
clearly erroneous.'" The Tax Court's finding as to the substance
842 (D.S.D. 1961); Cravens v. Commissioner. 272 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1959), rev'g 30 T.C.
903 (1958); Gaddis v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 741 (S.D. Miss. 1971); Estate of Cohen,
39 T.C.M. (P-H) 1331 (1970); Tim W. Lillie. 45 T.C. 54 (1965), affd per curiam, 370 F.2d
562 (9th Cir. 1966); John Ernst, 32 T.C. 181 (1959), acq'd in 1959-2 C.B. 4. See generally
Pinney & Olsen, supra note 5.
564 F.2d at 35.
In reaching this decision, the Tenth Circuit declined to address the issue of piercing
the corporate veil between these two corporations. The court stated that the question to
be decided was what constituted payment by a cash method taxpayer which is a question
of federal, not state law, and does not depend on the relationship between the two corporations. Id. at 36.
"Id.
, Id at 36-37.
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of the transaction was that the parties at all times intended the
1969 repurchase and, therefore, the 1968 transfer was not genuine. The Tenth Circuit supported this finding with the following
factors: (1) Weisbart was the owner of 92% of the stock of the
7A Company and the owner of 100% of the stock of Weisbart and
Company; (2) the repurchase price was exactly the same as the
original price, which was significant because the value of contract
rights such as these are subject to substantial fluctuation; (3) if
the transfer had been real, it would have placed the cattle under
the ownership of the feed corporation, thereby defeating the purpose of the separate incorporation of the two companies; and, (4)
the availability to Weisbart of a line of credit at a bank, which
had been increased on December 20, 1968, a few days after the
transaction, refuted the contention that the contract rights had
been used due to a shortage of available cash, and supported the
eventual conclusion that the transfer had been intended to be a
temporary one. 3
In reaching its conclusion the Tenth Circuit relied on wellknown precedents 4 developing the factors which, if met, will
allow a farmer to deduct the prepayment of feed."5 The factors can
be summarized as follows:
(1) The payment should be an actual outlay of money (i.e., cash, not
notes);
(2) there should be a binding written contract specifying price and quantity;
(3) there should be no provision for refunds, i.e., the expenditure must
be for payment only, not a deposit;
"

Id. at 36.

The Tenth Circuit specifically relied on Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673 (8th
Cir. 1973); Shippy v. United States, 308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962); Cravens v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1959); John Ernst, 32 T.C. 181 (1959), acq'd in 1959-2 CB.
4. Treasury Regulations relied on were as follows: Tress. Reg. §§ 1.446-(1)(c)(1)(i) (1973),
1.461-1(a)(1) (1967), 1.62-12(a) (1972).
"1 In order to preserve his deduction, the taxpayer must first qualify as a farmer. See,
e.g., Hi-Plains Enterprises v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 520 (10th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Chemell, 243 F.2d 944 (5th Cir 1957). Treasury Regulations define "farm" and
"farmer" as follows:
As used in this section, the term "farm" embraces the farm in the ordinarily
accepted sense, and includes stock, dairy, poultry, fruit, and truck farms;
also plantations, ranches, and all land used for farming operations. All i dividuals, partnerships, or corporations that cultivate, operate, or manage
farms for gain or profit, either as owners or tenants, are designated as farmers.
Tress. Reg. § 1.61-4, T.D. 7198, 1972-2 C,B. 166. See also Tress. Reg. §§ 1.175-3, -4 (1957),
1.182-2 (1965).
"
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(4) only reasonable amounts of feed for the number of cattle to be fed
should be purchased;
(5) risk of loss (e.g., ownership) should pass to the taxpayer;
(6) services (e.g., yardage, veterinary services, etc.) should not be prepaid;
(7) a valid business purpose (e.g., to insure supply, obtain preferential
treatment or delivery, establish a set price, etc.) should be present, not mere
tax avoidance."5
(8) the payment must not materially distort the taxpayer's income. 7

The payment/deposit test is uniformly supported by the case
law,"5 and it was the major factor in the Tenth Circuit's upholding
of the Tax Court's refusal of the deduction. The court noted that
transactions of this nature that have been upheld usually involve
payments in cash," but the true deciding factor is the finality of
the payments. 20 The court also reviewed several cases concluding
that notes cannot be the basis for a deduction for a cash basis.
taxpayer since a cash basis taxpayer can only claim a deduction
for payments made in cash or its equivalent; notes from a cash
basis taxpayer are not the equivalent of cash since such notes are
merely promises to pay, which may not be fulfilled."'
The court ended by observing that Weisbart, being a cashbasis taxpayer, would be allowed to take a deduction in the year
cash or its equivalent was paid, and
[Iln the case of an executory contract of sale in which payments
are deferred and are evidenced only by the contracts, the deferred
payments are ordinarily not taxed to the cash basis seller until received .... The cash equivalency rule is the same for items of
income as it is for deductions. . . .Payments under such a contract
are not deductible by the purchaser who is on a cash basis until the
actual payment."
'
See generally cases cited note 8 supra; and Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975-1 C.B. 144. See
also Pinney & Olsen, supra note 5, at 542-43; Willingham & Kasmir, Prepaid Feed Deduction: How to Cope with the IRS' Restrictive New Ruling, 42-43 J. TAX. 230 (1975).
11Weisbart v. Commissioner, 564 F.2d 34; Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975-1 C.B. 144. See also
Willingham & Kasmir, supra note 15, at 230-31.
"1 See, e.g., Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g 41 T.C.M. (PH) 843 (1972); Shippy v. United States, 308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962), aff'g 199 F. Supp.
842 (D.S.D. 1961); Cravens v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1959); Estate of
Cohen, 39 T.C.M. (P-H) 1331 (1970); John Ernst, 32 T.C. 181 (1959).
" See generally authorities cited note 17 supra.
564 F.2d at 38.
, Cases reviewed by the court included: Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429
U.S. 569, 577.78 (1977); Baltimore Dairy Lunch, Inc. v. United States, 231 F.2d 870 (8th
Cir. 1956). The Tenth Circuit also relied on Tress. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (1973), 1.461I(a)(1) (1967); and 2 J. MEirrENs, THE LAw OF FEDERAL IcomE TAXATION § 11.02 (1974).
564 F.2d at 38.
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The court then stated that due to the lack of substance found
by the Tax Court in the transaction, which was supported in the
mind of the Tenth Circuit by the facts enunciated above, the
transfer of the contract rights brought the case within the rule
applicable to executory contracts.2
Weisbart re-emphasizes the importance of the factors outlined above. Cash basis farmers within the jurisdiction of the
Tenth Circuit should never lose a deduction for the prepayment
of feed if they simply conform to the guidelines delineated by the
Internal Revenue Service and the Tenth Circuit.
IL, THE TAXATION OF PATENT TRANSFERS: Eickmyer c
2
Commissioner

The eligibility of patent transfers for treatment as capital
transactions has long been an area of controversy. In the past, the
difficulty lay not in the nature of the property transferred but
rather in the manner in which it was transferred. Frequently, the
seller received his consideration in the form of "royalties" over a
period of time, usually coterminous with the life of the patent,
and he retained some degree of control over the patent until the
purchase price was paid.2 This form of transfer created problems
in meeting the Internal Revenue Code requirement that, for capital gains treatment, there must be a sale or exchange of the property. 2 On the basis of two early Supreme Court cases,27 the Commissioner maintained for several years that if the consideration
received for a patent was in the form of "royalties" paid over a
period coterminous with the life of the patent, the transaction
was a license and could not be treated as a sale within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code.28
One of these cases, Waterman v. Mackenzie,"' still remains
as precedent for the taxation of patent sales. Even though
Waterman itself is not a tax case, it has been cited as authority
Sld.
580 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1978).
25 Comment, Capital Gains Treatment of Proceedsfrom Patent Transfers.. .4 Mo. 1_
Re. 98, 99 (1969).
= I.R.C. § 1231.
' United States v. General Electric, 272 U.S. 476 (1926); Waterman v. MacKenzie,
138 U.S. 252 (1891).
Comment, supra note 25, at 99.
138 U.S. 252 (1891).
2.

1979
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in nearly every patent tax case involving the question of a "sale
or exchange" within the past two decades. In Waterman,3 the
Supreme Court held that:
The patentee or his assigns may, by instrument in writing, assign,
grant and convey, either, 1st, the whole patent, comprising the exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention throughout the
United States; or, 2d, an undivided part or share of the exclusive
right; or 3d, the exclusive right under the patent within and
throughout a specified part of the United States . . . Any assignment or transfer, short of one of these, is a mere license, giving the
licensee no title in the patent, and no right to sue at law in his own
name for an infringement. ... n

It was this language that established the basic criteria for a
sale of a patent for federal income tax purposes, and provided
support for the position that periodic payments received for the
use of a patent could not qualify for capital gains treatment.M
A turning point for the taxpayer/inventor came in the case
of Edward C. Myers.u Myers had transferred the exclusive right
to use, manufacture, and sell his patented invention, but he had
retained the right to terminate the agreement if a certain amount
of royalty payments were not made, and the transferee had the
right to terminate after a certain date.Y The Commissioner
argued that these provisions were inconsistent with a sale of a
patent and therefore no capital gains treatment could be accorded the transfer. The Supreme Court rejected this argument
See, e.g., Eickmeyer v. Commissioner, 580 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1978); Commissioner
v. Celanese Corp. of America, 140 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Commissioner v. Hopkinson,
126 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1942); Claude Neon Lights, Inc. 35 B.T.A. 424 (1937); Julius E.
Lilienfeld, 35 B.T.A. 391 (1937); Parke, Davis & Co., 31 B.T.A. 427 (1934), cited in
Comment, supra note 25, at 100 & n. 16.
11In Waterman the plaintiff was suing for infringement of a patent, posing his right
to sue on an agreement whereby the owner of the patent had granted him the "sole and
exclusive right to manufacture and sell under the patent." The defendant claimed that
the plaintiff had no right to sue because he was a mere licensee. 138 U.S. 252, 253 (1891).
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant and held that the agreement was a license,
not an assignment because the plaintiff had received no grant of the right to use the
patented item. Id. at 257.
Id. at 255.
J' Comment, supra note 25, at 100.

3, 6 T.C. 258 (1946). Myers had invented and patented a rubber covered flexible steel
track and had transferred it to B. F. Goodrich Rubber Co. in consideration for annual
royalties based on a percentage of sales. Id. at 259-61. See also, Comment, supra note 25,
at 100.
Id. at 259-60.
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and held that these provisions were merely conditions subsequent
which did not prevent the passing of legal title. The Court distinguished this transaction from the one involved in Waterman v.
Mackenzie on the grounds that here transferee's exclusive license
included the express authority to use the invention,
whereas in
31
absent.
been
had
authority
this
Waterman
Initially, the Commissioner acquiesced, but four years later
37
this acquiescence and substituted nonacquiescence.
revoked
he
Due to the need to resolve the confusion created by the Commissioner's nonacquiescence, and partially because of sympathy for
the taxpayer/inventor, Congress enacted section 1235 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.3 The statute eliminates problems associated with the method of payment for the patent and the use
of terms inconsistent with the granting of an assignment. Additionally, the legislative history of section 1235 clearly indicates
that capital gains treatment will be allowed despite the presence
of a clause in the written agreement that the rights to a particular
patent may revert to the transferor on the occurrence of a condi3
tion subsequent.
Section 1235's provisions as to what constitutes a sale or
exchange of a patent read not unlike Waterman's requirements,
but with one important difference. Section 1235 provides as follows:
A transfer .
of property consisting of all substantial rights to a
patent, or an undivided interest therein which includes a part of all
such rights, by any holder shall be considered the sale or exchange
of a capital asset held for more than 1 year, regardless of whether or
not payments in consideration of such transfer are(1) payable periodically over a period generally coterminous
with the transferee's use of the patent, or
(2) contingent on the productivity, use or disposition of the
property transferred. 40
31Id. at 263. See alo, Comment, supra note 25, at 100.
1946-1 C.B. 3, nonacq. 1950-1 C.B. 7, acq. 1958-1 C.B. 6.
" Comment, supra note 25, at 100-01.
"

See generally Notes, Capital Gains Treatment of Patent Transfer, 17 W. Ras. L.

REv. 844 (1966).

I.R.C. § 1235(a). Of course, the transfer cannot be by gift, devise or inheritance.
Id. Additionally, the holder of the patent must be the individual whose efforts created the
property or any other individual who has acquired an interest in such property in exchange
for consideration in money or its equivalent prior to the actual reduction to practice of
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This section naturally resolved the problem of periodic payments which had rendered a transfer of a patent a mere license
not qualifying for capital gains treatment. Not surprisingly, the
statute created a new problem. This new problem centers around
the definition of what is a sale of "all substantial rights" and the
definition of what is a sale of "an undivided interest therein
which includes a part of all such rights."
The regulations are helpful in providing a definition for these
terms. The regulations define all substantial rights to mean all
rights (whether or not then held by the grantor) which are of value
at the time the rights to the patent (or an undivided interest
therein) are transferred." The term "all substantial rights" to a
patent does not include a grant of rights to a patent which:
(1) is limited geographically within the county of issuance,
(2) is limited in duration by the terms of the agreement to a period
less than the remaining life of the patent,
(3) grants rights to the grantee in fields or use, within trades, or
industries which are less than all the rights covered by the patent
which exist and have value at the time of the grant,
(4) grants to the grantee less than all the claims or inventions
covered2 by the patent which exist and have value at the time of the
grant.

1

Rights which are not considered substantial, of course, may
be retained by the holder. 3
Importantly, however, the regulations provide that the circumstances of the whole transaction, rather than the particular
language used in the document of transfer, shall be considered in
determining whether or not all substantial rights to a patent are
transferred." The regulations give two examples of rights which
the invention covered by the patent so long as the person is neither the employer of the

creator nor related to the creator. Id. § 1235(b), (d).
Tress. Reg. § 1.1235-2 (1957).
" Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(i)-(iv).
Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(2)(i)-(ii). The regulations give two examples of rights which may
be retained by the transferor:
(i) The retention by the transferor of legal title for the purpose of securing
performance or payment by the transferee in a transaction involving transfer
of an exclusive license to manufacture, use, and sell for the life of the patent;
(ii) The retention by the transferor of rights in the property which are not
inconsistent with the passage of ownership, such as the retention of a security
interest... . or a reservation in the nature of a condition subsequent ....

Id.
44Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(1).
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may or may not be substantial depending upon the circumstances
of the whole transaction: (1) the retention by the transferor of an
absolute right to prohibit sublicensing or subassignment by the
transferee;" and (2) the failure to convey to the transferee the
right to use or to sell the patent property." Of course, the retention of a right to terminate the transfer at will is the retention of
a substantial right. 7
Finally, the regulations provide that a person owns an undivided interest in all substantial rights in a patent when he owns
the same fractional share of each and every substantial right to
the patent." This does not include, by way of an example, a right
to the income from a patent, or a license limited geographically,
or a license which covers some, but not all, of the valuable claims
or uses covered by the patent." Furthermore, a transfer limited
in duration to a period less than the remaining life of the patent
is not a transfer of an undivided interest in all of the substantial
rights to a patent.N
In Eickmeyer v. Commissioner5 the Tenth Circuit dealt with
the problem delineated above in determining whether there had
been a transfer to an "undivided interest," as defined by the
Code, in "all substantial rights" to a patent so that the royalties
2
paid to the transferor could receive capital gains treatment.
Eickmeyer developed and patented in 1974 a process which
had wide application in the oil refining, petrochemical and fertilizing industries. The process was called the Catacarb process
and Eickmeyer was the only record owner.53
From January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1970, Eickmeyer entered into twelve separate agreements for the use of the Catacarb
process, and during the three years for which the Internal Revenue Service had found a deficiency in Eickmeyer's income taxes,
he had received payments pursuant to eight of those agreements.
- Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(3)(i).
- Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(3)(ii).
- Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(4).
IId. § 1.1235-2(c).

Id.
*Id.
o

580 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 397-98.
I"
"Id. at 397.
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Eickmeyer claimed that the royalties received from the agreements were eligible for capital gains treatment under section
1235, but the Commissioner disagreed, claiming that not all of
the substantial rights to the patent had been transferred .'
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Commissioner. The court
noted that even though the percentage of ownership or quantity
of ownership need not be the same as that of the transferor, "the
character of the right of transfer must be the same. Each element
in the title must be present in that which is transferred."5 5 The
court further noted that in order to receive capital gains treatment there had to have been a sale of an interest in all of the
rights which the transferor had in the patent, and that the interest transferred by Eickmeyer fell short of this requirement." The
crucial right which Eickmeyer had retained, according to the
Tenth Circuit, was the right to collect royalties for all uses of the
patent not only from the original transferees, but also from their
subassignees or sublicensees 7 All the substantial rights to the
patent had not been transferred by Eickmeyer, the court observed, for if his transferees were to grant a sublicense or subassignment they would only be doing so in behalf of Eickmeyer; the
royalties would inevitably be paid to Eickmeyer either by his
transferee or the subtransferee. 5 1 The Tenth Circuit concluded
that the practical effect of Eickmeyer's assignment was to grant
non-exclusive licenses to each of the transferees and, as each of
the transferees remained under the control of Eickmeyer and were
not true owners of their respective interests, section 1235 treatment was not available.5
Therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit, the
term "undivided interest" contemplates a fractional interest in
all of the rights which are part of the ownership of the patent.
There is no such transfer when the transferor retains the right to
payments or royalties, based on use, from subassignees or sub34

Id.

55 Id.

:,Id.
'7 Id. All of the contracts purported to give the assignees of the patent the right to
transfer a similar interest to other parties. However this provision was coupled with the
requirement that the compensation measured by the extended use of the patent by these
subassignees must flow to Eickmeyer.
Id. at 400.
59 Id.
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transferees, and the original transferees or assignees remain accountable to the transferor."
II.

SECTION 337 AND THE PROBLEM OF EXPENSES ARISING FROM THE

AsSETs: Benedict Oil Company v. United
6
States. '
Section 337 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code was enacted
in an effort to eliminate an inequitable distinction in tax treatment of certain methods of corporate liquidation." Before the
enactment of section 337, if a corporation sold its assets prior to
liquidation in an attempt to distribute cash to its stockholders in
exchange for their stock, the corporation was still taxed at the
corporate level for any gain made on the sale. 3 However, if the
corporation chose instead to make an in kind distribution of the
assets to the stockholders in exchange for their stock, no gain or
loss was recognized to the liquidating corporation, only to the
stockholders."
Section 337 eliminated this distinction, which had often resulted in a difference in the net realizable distribution to a shareholder in liquidation, by providing:
SALE OF CORPORATE

(a)

General Rule-If-

(1) A corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or
after June 22, 1954, and
(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the
adoption of such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the
sale or exchange by it of property within such 12-month period.'

Therefore, if the requirements of section 337 are met, the
corporation recognizes no gain or loss from the sale of its corporate assets.
However, even though no gain or loss is recognized by the
corporation under section 337, the corporation would naturally
incur expenses, usually in the form of attorney and brokerage
"Id.
" 582 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1978).
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2nd Seas. 38-39 A106 (1954), reprinted in [1954]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4244.
u See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
See, e.g., United States v. Cumberland Public Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950); see
generally I.R.C. § 336.
- I.R.C. § 337.
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fees, while attempting to sell those assets prior to liquidation. In
United States v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Company" the
Tenth Circuit, following the only other circuit court decision at
7 held that legal fees
that time, PridemarkInc. v. Commissioner,"
related to the sale of assets during a section 337 liquidation were
deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense under
68
section 162 of the Code.
This ruling, however, was not subsequently followed by any
other circuit court." Additionally, the Fourth Circuit reversed its
earlier decision in Pridemark Inc. v. Commissioner,7° and joined
the view of the other circuits holding that expenses attributable
to the sale of assets pursuant to a section 337 liquidation must
be offset against the gain from the sale and are not deductible
7
under section 162. '
Benedict Oil Company v Commissioner" is an important
Tenth Circuit decision in that it overrules Mountain States
Mixed Feed Company, and brings the Tenth Circuit into accord
- 365 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1966).
,7345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), rev'd, Of Course Inc. v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 754
(4th Cir. 1974).
" United States v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co., 365 F.2d 244, 245 (10th Cir.
1966). The Tenth Circuit's rationale for this holding was expressed as follows:
It is difficult to determine any reason in the authorities or in the statutes
for any distinction as to the type or purpose of the legal work involved. It is
probable that the attorneys could account for the time they devoted to the
corporate dissolution as compared with the sale of assets, but there is no
reason why this sale of assets is not as much a part of the liquidation as the
dissolution of the corporation. Certainly if the costs of distribution in kind
may be deducted as ordinary expenses, the legal cost of the sale of assets
should likewise be deductible. Thus. it is all part of the liquidationdissolution of the corporate entity.
Id. at 245-46. See also Pridemark Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965).
" Page v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975); Connery v. United States,
460 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1972); Lanrao Inc. v. United States, 422 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); United States v. Morton, 387 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1968);
Alphaco, Inc. v. Nelson, 385 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1967).
1*Pridemark Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), rev'd, Of Course, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1974).
" See generally cases cited notes 68 and 69 supra.
" 582 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1978). It should be carefully noted that, even though expenses incurred in the selling of corporate assets are no longer deductible as ordinary and
necessary expenses, nevertheless expenses, such as accounting or legal fees, attributable
to the complete liquidation of the corporation are still deductible. See, e.g., Gravois
Planning Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962). Therefore, attorneys and
accountants should keep careful records of their time and expenses allocable to the liquidation in order to insure that these items will not be treated as selling expenses.
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with the other circuit courts which have decided the same issue.
Benedict Oil Company in 1965 adopted a plan of liquidation pursuant to section 337, and successfully met the requirements of the
statute. 3 On its last income tax return, relying on Mountain
States Mixed Feed Company, the corporation deducted as an
ordinary and necessary business expense the accounting, legal
and brokerage fees attributable to the sale of the assets." The
Commissioner disallowed the deduction by stating that the expenses incurred had to be offset against any gain made on the
sale. 5
The Tenth Circuit reversed its prior holding, and upheld the
Commissioner's disallowance. 71 In doing so the Tenth Circuit relied not only on the authority established in other jurisdictions,
but also upon the traditional rule that costs incurred in the selling
of capital assets are capital expenditures which must be offset
against the gain made on the sale, not expenses deductible
against ordinary income."
The Tenth Circuit further supported its reversal by noting
that shareholders, who receive corporate assets in exchange for
their stock and then sell the assets, are subject to the rule requir6582 F.2d at 545.
' Id. at 545-46.

IZ
Id. at 545.

Id. at 546.
Id. at 546, 548. See Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970), which reaffirmed this rule by stating:
Since the inception of the present federal income tax in 1913, capital expenditures have not been deductible. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 263.
Such expenditures are added to the basis of the capital asset with respect to
which they are incurred, and are taken into account for tax purposes either
through depreciation or by reducing the capital gain (or increasing the loss)
when the asset is sold. If the expense is capital, it cannot be deducted as
"ordinary and necessary," either as a business expense under § 162 of the
Code or as an expense of "management, conservation, or maintenance"
under § 212.
It has long been recognized, as a general matter, that costs incurred in
the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset are to be treated as capital
expenditures. The most familiar example of such treatment is the capitalization of brokerage fees for the sale or purchase of securities,
. (footnotes
omitted).
582 F.2d at 574-75. Of course if there is a loss on the sale of the capital asset, the expense
of selling that asset will increase the amount of loss, the deduction for which must be
compiled in accord with Subchapter P of the Internal Revenue Code. See generally I.R.C.
§§ 1201-1254.
"

"

1979
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ing the selling expenses to be offset against the gain on the sale.
In light of this fact, to follow Mountain States Mixed Feed
Company would promote a distinction in the tax treatment of
these two forms of corporate liquidation, perpetuating a dependence upon good tax advice, and putting a premium on recognizing
the problem early, all of which section 337 was designed to eliminate.7"
IV.

THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF RESERVES FOR COMMISSIONS EARNED ON

Western Casualty and Surety
Company v. Commissioner."
Insurance companies, since 1913, have had special taxation
treatment due to the policy of the non-taxation, as income, of
that part of the premium which the insurance company must
place in reserve in order to meet obligations under its policies."
Western Casualty and Surety Company deals with the sections
of the Code that handle these unique and special taxation problems. The opinion of the Tenth Circuit is organized into two
distinct sections. The first section deals with the issue of whether
Western Casualty was entitled to deduct as an expense commissions on deferred premium installments under section 832 (b)(6).
The second section deals with the problem of how to adjust Western Casualty's income in the year of change in the accounting
method, an issue which was contingent upon the Tenth Circuit
upholding the Commissioner's decision to disallow a deduction of
the deferred commissions."
Western Casualty had two basic methods of payment for
insurance policies. The method involved in this particular litigation consisted of issuing insurance policies of one year duration,
and allowing the premiums to be paid in installments within the
policy year. 2 All policies lapsed if there was failure to pay a
premium, and nonpayment of the premium installments was an
option of the policyholder under the insurance agreement. The
portions of the premium which were not paid at the outset with
DEFERRED PREMIUM INSTALLMENTS:

582 F.2d at 548.
571 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1978).
See e.g., Commissioner N, Standard Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 433 U.S. 148, 152-54
(1977); see generally I.R.C. §§ 801-844.
"4 571 F.2d at 515.
'

'

92Id.
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this particular
type of policy were called "deferred premium installments. ' ' m
Western Casualty, in its annual National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) statement, elected to treat its
deferred premium installments as though they had been prepaid,
but the deferred premiums were not included in the company's
income for tax purposes in the year that the policy was sold."
Each year, Western Casualty would establish a reserve for deferred premium installments, and a reserve for the aggregate
amount of commissions to be paid to the salesmen on these one
year insurance policies. However, the salesmen were only paid
their proportionate part of the commissions if and when the policyholder paid his installment on the premium. In that event, the
reserve for commissions was reduced by the appropriate amount,
and the salesmen were paid their respective portion of the total
commission on the policy91
It was these reserves for commissions that created the dispute between Western Casualty and the Internal Revenue Service. During the years in question, Western Casualty added the
amounts of the reserves for commissions to the commissions actually paid and deducted the entire sum as a business expense.
Inasmuch as the policyholders were not obligated to pay the
premiums, and could let the insurance lapse if they so desired,
the Commissioner and the Tax Court determined that Western
Casualty would not be obligated to pay the commissions until the
premiums had actually been paid, and, therefore, the deduction
of the entire amount constituted an over-deduction to the extent
that it included the unpaid commissions on the deferred premium
installments."
The Tenth Circuit, relying heavily upon the analysis of the
Tax Court, upheld this decision. The applicable taxing statutes
were sections 832 and 162. 87 Section 832 (b)(6) defines "expenses
3 Id.
" Id. Western Casualty also had the option of including these deferred premium
installments as they became due.
Id. at 516.
UId.

, Id. The tax court also relied on Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii), which provides that
a deduction under the accrual method of accounting is not allowable unless all events have
occurred which establish the fact of liability giving rise to the deduction. The Tenth
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incurred" as all expenses shown on the annual statement approved by the \:ational Association of Insurance Commissioners,
which expenses are deductible from income if so allowed by section 832(c). Section 832(c) defines which of the expenses are deductible from ordinary income by the insurance companies, and
authorizes their deduction. Section 832(c)(1) permits a deduction
for all "ordinary and necessary expenses incurred, as provided in
section 162 (relating to trade or business expenses)."
The Tenth Circuit accepted the Tax Court's analysis that
section 832 expressly incorporated section 162 and its standards."
Under section 162 standards, and the rules and regulations applicable to accrual taxpayers, the commissions could not be considered an expense since all events had not occurred, i.e., the
paying of the premium by the policyholder, which fixed on the
insurance company the obligation to pay the commissions."
Additionally, to deduct as an expense commissions earned on
premiums when those same premiums have not been included in
the income of the taxpayer would cause the taxpayer's method of
accounting to fail to reflect the income from which the expense
of commissions arose and from which the expense should appropriately be deducted. Hence, the taxpayer's accounting methods
distorted his income." Furthermore, the taxpayer's method of
accounting violated the general policy of symmetry of income and
Circuit did not explicitly rely on this regulation, but it did so implicitly by stating that it
agreed completely with the Tax Court's analysis. 571 F.2d at 517.
I.R.C. §§ 832(b)(6), 832(c), 832(c)(1). Specifically, these sections read as follows:
(6) Expenses incurred.-The term "expenses incurred" means all expenses shown on the annual statement approved by the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners, and shall be computed as follows: To all expenses paid during the taxable year, add expenses unpaid at the end of the
taxable year and deduct expenses unpaid at the end of the preceding taxable
year. For the purpose of computing the taxable income subject to the tax
imposed by section 831, there shall be deducted from expenses incurred (as
defined in this paragraph) all expenses incurred which are not allowed as
deductions by subsection (c).
(c) Deductions Allowed.-In computing the taxable income of an insurance company subject to the tax imposed by section 831, there shall be
allowed as deductions:
(1) all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred, as provided in section 162 (relating to trade or business expenses).
o 571 F.2d at 517. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) is implicitly incorporated in this part
ot the Tenth Circuit's analysis.
571 F.2d at 517.
"Id.
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expenses as prescribed by the United States Supreme Court."
Significantly, the Tenth Circuit rejected the contention that
all expenses are deductible if they are contained in the annual
statement approved by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners. Western Casualty had argued that the presence
of unpaid commissions on the annual statement form was enough
to render them expenses within the terms of the statute, and
deductible without needing to fulfill the requirements of section
162. The Tenth Circuit held that even though some deference
may be given the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' form, that form was not absolute, and where it conflicted with
the ordinary requirements of section 162, the latter prevailed. 3
This holding, the court observed, was the logical conclusion to be
reached by reading sections 832(b)(6) and 832(c) together. As
noted previously, 832(b)(6) prohibits deduction of expenses which
do not conform to the requirement of 832(c). Section 832(c)(1)
allows for deduction of necessary and ordinary business expenses
as provided in section 162. To hold that the requirements of section 162 need not be met as long as the expenses were of the type
contained in the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' form would, the Tenth Circuit felt, subvert the meaning of
section 162.11
The second half of the decision dealt with the problem of
adjusting the taxpayer's income pursuant to section 481(a).15 SecCommissioner v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 433 U.S. 148 (1977).
571 F.2d at 517. See also Commissioner v. General Reinsurance Corp., 190 F.2d 148,
161 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 863 (1951); Commissioner v. United States
Guarantee Co., 190 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1951).
" 571 F.2d at 517. See also 8 J. Marrais, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §
44.55 (1970).
571 F.2d at 518. The text of § 481(a) is as follows:
SEC 481. ADJUSTMENTS REQUIRED BY CHANGES IN METHOD
OF ACCOUNTING.
(a) General Rule.-In computing the taxpayer's taxable income for
any taxable year (referred to in this section as the "year of the change")(1) if such computation is under a method of accounting different from the method under which the taxpayer's taxable income for
the preceding taxable year was computed, then
(2) there shall be taken into account those adjustments which
are determined to be necessary solely by reason of the change in order
to prevent amounts from being duplicated or omitted, except there
shall not be taken into account any adjustment in respect to any
taxable year to which this section does not apply unless the adjust92
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tion 481. provides that if a taxpayer computes his income under a
method of accounting different from the method under which the
taxable income for the preceding year was calculated, there shall
be taken into account, in the year of change, those adjustments
necessary to prevent the duplication or omission of amounts of
gross income or deductions."
Adjustment was essential in Western Casualty in order to
prevent the duplication of the deduction of the commissions both
in the current year and in later years. 7 The Tenth Circuit gave
the Commissioner broad authority to make the required adjustments. and it rejected the contention that section 481 requires an
adjustment only for items that would be omitted or duplicated
during the year of change in the accounting method." The court
stated that section 481 had no limitation on the "amounts being
duplicated or omitted for which adjustment is required," and to
impose such a limitation would be inconsistent with the intent of
Congress which was to prevent items of income and expense from
being reported more than once or omitted entirely." The Tenth
Circuit also noted that both the Senate and the House legislative
history reflected the intention that section 481 adjustments were
to be used to prevent duplication or omissions in taxable years
after the year of change.'1' Therefore, the Commissioner had the
authority to make section 481 adjustments even though the duplications or omissions might not occur for many years after the
change in the accounting method."'°
Christa M. de la Garza
ment is attributable to a change in the method of accounting initiated
by the taxpayer.
For an excellent discussion of the statute and the problems solved and caused by it, see
Note, Problems Arising From Changes in Tax Accounting Methods, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1564
11960).

" 571 F.2d at 518.
.7 Id.
- Id.
" Id. at 520 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Seas. reprinted in [19541
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4076, 4303; S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.
reprinted in 119541 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 4621, 4696, 4947).
11 571 F.2d at 520, (citing H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Seas. reprinted in
[19541 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEws 4017, 4303-04; S. REP. No. 1620, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.
reprinted in 119541 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4948-49). See also, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.481-2(d), example (1) (1974).
"1 571 F.2d at 520.

